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In the exercise of their regulatory, investigatory, and general
administrative responsibilities, federal agencies obtain from Ameri-
can businesses an enormous amount of material containing de-
tailed commercial and financial information.' A sizeable portion of
this accumulated data is of little or no commercial value, but in
many cases businesses have a substantial stake in keeping secret the
information they submit to a federal agency.2 As a result, a consid-
1. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States at 4-6, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (providing examples of busi-
ness secrets in agency files); HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FREEDOM OF IN-
FORMATION ACT REQUESTS FOR BUSINESS DATA AND REVERSE-FOIA LAWSUrrs, H.R. REP.
No. 1382, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 13-14 (1978) (explaining business data requirements of
federal agencies) [hereinafter cited as 1978 FOIA REPORT]; Freedom of Information Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 293, 294 (1977) (statement of Burt A. Braverman, attorney)
("vast array of private information" in possession of agencies) [hereinafter cited as 1977
Senate Hearings].
2. For example, public disclosure of a business' Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
"manning" tables, which detail the racial and sexual composition of a particular workforce
and are required to be submitted by all government contractors under Exec. Order No.
11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation) (amended version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
app., at 392 (Supp. III 1979)), could have undesirable commercial consequences, because
other companies might analyze and exploit the information and thereby obtain a competi-
tive advantage. See Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 176 (D. Del. 1976), va-
cated, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). In addition to these competitive disadvantages, businesses
seek to avoid other deleterious consequences. Public interest groups might publicize the
data in order to expose the business' affirmative action failures, see Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1209-12 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd, 606 F.2d 1031
(D.C. Cir. 1979), and litigious unions and employees might use the statistics to challenge
the business' hiring and promotion practices, see Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B.
106, 110-11 (1978), modified and enforced sub nom. IUE v. NLRB, No. 78-2067 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 28, 1980). See generally Connolly & Fox, Employer Rights and Access to Documents Under
the Freedom ofInformation Act, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 203, 203-07 (1977) (discussing attempts
by various parties to obtain EEO reports).
Businesses can advance a claim of confidentiality with respect to much of the informa-
tion that government collects from them. See, e.g., Mobile Infirmary Ass'n v. Harris, 1
GOV'T DIscLosuRE (P-H) 79,197 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 1979) (Medicare Provider Cost re-
ports); Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C., 4 DOE (CCH) 80,146 (Sept. 7,
1979) (energy-related information); 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8 (citing other
examples); McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Informna-
tion: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REv. 837, 849-51 (1980) (results of
Business Records
erable dispute has developed in recent years over the extent to
which federal agencies may release commercially sensitive business
documents pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)3 re-
quest.4
This Note argues that existing legal doctrines have failed ade-
quately to reconcile the conflicting principles of disclosure and
nondisclosure at the heart of the current business records contro-
versy. At present, agencies possess too much discretion to withhold
information arbitrarily and not enough discretion to disclose it un-
der appropriate circumstances, with the result that the principle of
disclosure is often sacrificed to that of nondisclosure. The Note
applies procedural techniques from the civil discovery and the
FOIA personal privacy contexts to fashion a more coherent ap-
proach to the disclosure of government-held business documents.
This approach would require agencies to balance, in each particu-
lar case, all of the interests, both public and private, at stake in any
disclosure or nondisclosure decision. It would maximize the poten-
tial for the disclosure of business records without unduly im-
pinging upon the interests of those who supply business informa-
tion to the government.
I. The Legal Evolution of the Business Records Controversy
In 1966, after many years of hearings and debates,5 Congress
adopted the Freedom of Information Act, a legislative effort to re-
alize "the ideals of our democratic society' 6 by opening up the
drug, pesticide, and toxic substance tests); Note, The Freedom of Nonfree Information: An Eco-
nomic Proposal for Government Disclosure of Privately Submitted Commercial Information, 32 STAN.
L. REV. 339, 339 n.3 (1980) (citing cases).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
4. See generally Freedom of Information, Sunshine, and Privacy Laws: Impact on Business, 34
Bus. LAW. 977 (1979); O'Reilly, Government Disclosure of Private Secrets Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 30 Bus. LAw. 1125 (1975); Patten & Weinstein, Disclosure of Business Secrets
Under the Freedom of Information Act: Suggested Limitations, 29 AD. L. REV. 193 (1977);
Wallace, Proper Disclosure and Indecent Exposure: Protection of Trade Secrets and Confidential
Commercial Information Supplied to the Government, 34 FED. B.J. 295 (1975).
5. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Fed-
ral Public Re cords Law: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Opera-
titrs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Freedom of Information: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Administrativt Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963); Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies: Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 84th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1955-1956).
6. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2429 [hereinafter cited as 1966 HOUSE REPORT with page cita-
tions to U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws].
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decisionmaking processes of the federal agencies to public scru-
tiny. 7 The Act reversed the presumption of secrecy that had been
accorded to agency-held records 8 and required each agency to
make available to "any person" upon request any of the records
within its possession,9 unless a requested document fell within a
number of narrowly drawn statutory exemptions.' 0 One such ex-
emption, added by Congress almost as an afterthought," relates
solely to government-held business records. According to subsec-
tion 552(b)(4), the provisions of the Act do not apply to "trade se-
crets and commercial or financial information obtained from a per-
son and privileged or confidential.' 12
7. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3, 10 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 SEN-
ATE REPORT]. For a general discussion of the FOIA, see THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECU-
RITY STUDIES, THE 1980 EDITION OF LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFOR-
MATION ACT AND PRIVACY ACT (5th ed. 1979); J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLO-
SURE: PROCEDURES, FORMS AND THE LAW 1-1 to 19-6 (1977); Davis, The Information Act: A
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (1967).
8. The FOIA replaced section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60
Stat. 237 (1946), which provided that, with certain exceptions, "matters of official record
shall .. .be made available to persons properly and directly concerned." In practice, few
individuals were able to satisfy that standard. Moreover, the statutory exceptions to section
3 were quite broad (for example, the section did not apply to "any function of the United
States requiring secrecy in the public interest," id., and did not require an agency to dis-
close "information held confidential for good cause," id. § 3(c)) and were invoked repeat-
edly by federal agencies seeking to deny requests for information. 1966 HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 6, at 2418-23; 1965 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3-5. See J. O'REILLY,
supra note 7, § 2.02 (discussing interpretation of section 3); Marson, Obtaining Access to In-
formation in the Files of Government Agencies: Discussion, 34 Bus. LAW. 1003, 1003-04 (1979)
(criticizing section 3 standard). Prior to the FOIA, agencies generally released business in-
formation within their files only in response to specific legislative mandates that had been
fashioned in order to remedy particular problems. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 3.13, at 226 (1958); J. O'REILLY, supra note 7, § 14.02, at 14-3.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
10. Id. § 552(b); see 1966 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2426-29 (explaining nine ex-
emptions in subsection (b)); 1965 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8-10 (same).
11. As originally drafted, the FOIA contained no exemption for business records. In
response to concerns voiced by both businesses and agencies during hearings on the pro-
posed Act, however, the Senate Judiciary Committee attached a provision which ultimately
became known as the "business records exemption." For a discussion of the legislative his-
tory of the exemption, see National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765,
766-70 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). Subsection (b)(4) has generated numerous problems of
statutory interpretation. See 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-19. Under the prevail-
ing interpretation, the term "confidential" refers to business information the disclosure of
which would either "impair" an agency's access to such "necessary information" in the fu-
ture or subject the submitter of such information to "substantial" competitive harm. Na-
tional Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The National Parks test has attracted its share of criticism. See Koch & Rubin, A Proposal
for a Comprehensive Restructuring of the Public Information System, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1, 54 (Na-
tional Parks standard "fundamentally ambiguous"); Patten & Weinstein, supra note 4, at
195-202 (better approach would focus on customary treatment given to information by its
owner). Despite this criticism, however, National Parks remains the benchmark from which
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Despite the (b)(4) exemption, the enactment of the FOIA made
available directly from the government a great deal of previously
undisclosed business information simply upon the request of any
interested party. 3 As an increasing number of individuals and or-
ganizations resorted to the FOIA in order to acquire business doc-
uments, an increasing number of complaints were voiced by busi-
ness representatives. In particular, it was alleged that the Act had
come to be used as a tool for industrial espionage' 4 and was being
employed to "pry business secrets from Uncle Sam's files""l merely
"for the price of a postage stamp."' 6 Some observers charged,
moreover, that agency officials, insensitive to commercial and com-
petitive realities, failed to recognize the harms-both to the partic-
ular business involved and to the economy as a whole-that fol-
lowed upon the forced disclosure of any business document. 17
all analysis of subsection (b)(4) must proceed. See Note, The Reverse-FOIA Lawsuit: Routes to
Nndiscloure After Chrysler, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 269, 289-90 (1980).
13. See Business Record Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 98, 111 (1977)
(statement of Burt A. Braverman, attorney) (-competitors, analysts, investors, disgruntled
employees, potential and existing adverse litigants, self-styled *public interest' groups, for-
eign businesses and governments and a wide variety of others" employ FOIA to obtain pri-
vate business information otherwise unavailable) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Hearings];
Wallace, supra note 4, at 295 (FOIA increases risk of disclosure of valuable commercial in-
formation).
14. See Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States at 7-10, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (FOIA employed as "vehicle
for industrial espionage"); 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 3, 4 (statement of Sherwin
Gardner, Deputy Commissioner, FDA) (FOIA used as means of corporate intelligence
gathering); English, Protecting the Stakeholder: Defense of the Government Agency's Interests Dur-
tng Reverw FOIA Lawsuits, 31 AD. L. REV. 151, 152-53 (1979) (majority of FOIA requests
submitted by businesses engaged in some form of industrial espionage); Montgomery, Pe-
ters, & Weinberg, The Freedom of Information Act: Strategic Opportunities and Threats, SLOAN
MANAGEMENT REV., Winter 1978, at 1-13 (discussing impact of FOIA on competitive envi-
ronment).
According to the General Accounting Office, in 1977 nearly half of all FOIA requests
received by surveyed agencies were submitted by businesses. This figure would be even
higher if requests submitted on behalf of businesses by law firms and other representatives
were included. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT FIELD OFFICES SHOULD BETTER IMPLEMENT THE FREE-
DOM OF INFORMATION ACT 37 (1978) (No. LCD-78-120) [hereinafter cited as GAO FOIA
REPORT]. For some agencies, the percentage of industry-generated FOIA applications
topped 801. See id. at 38 (Farmers Home Administration); Koch & Rubin, supra note 12,
at 17 n.54 (FDA).
15. Schorr, Telling Tales: How Law is Being Used to Pry Business Secrets From Uncle Sam's
Files, Wall St. J., May 9, 1977. at 1, col. 6.
16. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 13, at 98, 111 (statement of Burt A. Braverman, at-
torney).
17. See O'Reilly, Trade Secret Protection Under the Freedom of Information Act and Related
Statute.s, in PROTECTING AND PROFITING FROM TRADE SECRETS 1979, at 283, 292 (R. Milgrim
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Some commentators doubted whether much corporate spying
actually was taking place under the auspices of the FOIA. t8 Other
commentators contended that a different, largely unexpressed con-
cern was at the root of most business opposition to the FOIA. In-
formation had been sought from the government, often by public
interest organizations, concerning the enforcement by certain
agencies of specific public policies and the compliance with those
policies by certain businesses.' 9 It was suggested that public dissem-
ination of such information might subject a business to otherwise
avoidable litigation and embarrassment. 20
Whatever their actual motives, business submitters of confiden-
tial information began to sue federal agencies to enjoin them from
releasing the information to any third-party requester under the
FOIA.2 1 Agencies, courts, and commentators struggled to answer
ed. 1979) ("publicity-conscious" federal employees not responsive to claims of business confi-
dentiality); Patten & Weinstein, supra note 4, at 203 (agencies lack expertise needed to ana-
lyze possible competitive consequences of disclosure); cf. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note I,
at 39, 42 (testimony of Charles W. Stewart, President, Machinery & Allied Products Insti-
tute) (due to administrative burden of FOIA, great incentive on part of "bureaucratic peo-
ple" to disclose business documents).
18. See, e.g., Stevenson, FOIA Trade Secret Exemption: Are Problems Real? Legal Times of
Washington, Nov. 10, 1980, at 16, col. 1; cf 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 15, 16
(testimony of Michael A. James, Deputy General Counsel, EPA) (EPA refuses to override
company's claim of confidentiality unless provided with "very good basis" for doing so);
Saloschin & Pitt, Disclosure to Third Parties of Information Filed With Government Agencies: The
Agencies' Perspective, 34 Bus. LAW. 1061, 1064 (1979) (statement of Robert L. Saloschin,
Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (agencies afford
greater protection to business records than to national security information). One congres-
sional committee noted that specific instances of corporate espionage activity under the Act
were hard to document. 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. Other commentators con-
tended that corporate spying, if it occurs, is unobjectionable because it enhances competi-
tion. See Redburn, A Study in Fraudulent Fairness, BARRISTER, Fall 1975, at 22 (quoting Mark
Green, consumer activist).
19. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375 (1980) (suit by Con-
sumers Union and Public Citizen's Health Research Group for television manufacturers'
accident reports submitted to Consumer Product Safety Commission); Public Citizen
Health Research Group v. HEW, 477 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1979) (suit by Public Citizen
Health Research Group for reports on federally funded medical services required by
HEW); Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Federation of America, Women's Equity Action
League, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and Women's Legal De-
fense Fund at 13 n.20, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (virtually all reverse-
FOIA cases originated after requests from "ordinary citizens or citizen groups working on
behalf of consumers or minorities and women"). EEO manning tables, see note 2 supra, are
among the most sought-after government-held business documents. See note 22 infra.
20. See note 2 supra; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 297 (C.D.
Cal. 1974) (business feared embarrassment from disclosure of its affirmative action plan).
21. See Campbell, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation: The Need for Congressional
Action, 67 GEO. L.J. 103, 107 n.28, 108 n.29 (1978) (collecting cases). The plaintiff busi-
ness usually advanced any or all of the following arguments in support of a court order of
nondisclosure: that the information requested was exempt from mandatory disclosure un-
der subsection (b)(4) of the FOIA; that subsection (b)(4) was a mandatory nondisclosure
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two basic questions: Could an agency, pursuant to an FOIA re-
quest, release a business document that fell within the terms of sub-
section (b)(4)-that is, that contained either trade secrets or confi-
dential commercial or financial information? If so, what standards,
if any, were to govern an agency's release of that document? After
several years of reverse-FOIA litigation,2 2 and after a recent, unan-
imous Supreme Court decision,23 four broad doctrines have
emerged in response to these questions.
First, the courts have concluded, almost without dissent, that
subsection (b)(4) does not of itself bar an agency from releasing
business documents within its possession; rather, the (b)(4) exemp-
tion, as well as each of the other FOIA exemptions, simply gives an
agency the discretion to reject certain FOIA requests if it so de-
sires. 2 4 As the Supreme Court declared in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
"Congress did not limit an agency's discretion to disclose informa-
tion when it enacted the FOIA. ' '25 Exemption (b)(4) "demarcates
the agency's obligation to disclose" confidential commercial and fi-
nancial information, but does not itself "foreclose disclosure.
26
Second, the courts have concluded that, just as nothing in the
FOIA bars an agency from releasing exempt business records, so
too nothing in the Act obligates an agency to disclose exempt infor-
mation, or even to consider making such disclosures.27 Once an
provision and thus barred an agency from releasing confidential business records to which
it might enjoy access; that disclosure of the material in question would violate a federal
statute such as the Trade Secrets Act; that irreparable harm would result to the submitter
if the FOIA request were honored; and that release of the requested information would
constitute an abuse of agency discretion.
For a general discussion of reverse-FOIA suits, see 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at
53-67; Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business In-
formation: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEX. L. REV. 587, 591-633
(1977).
22. According to the Department of Justice, 76 reverse-FOIA cases were filed in 1976
and 63 in 1977. As of May 1978, 104 reverse-FOIA cases were pending in the federal
courts, with 34 involving EEO forms, 33 involving commercial information, and 20
involving Medicare cost reports. 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 54.
23. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
24. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290-94 (1979); Charles River Park "'A",
Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Clement, supra note 21, at 597-602
(citing cases).
25. 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979).
26. Id. at 292. The Court found Chrysler's contention that the FOIA imposes on fed-
eral agencies affirmative duties to withhold from disclosure certain "nongovernmental"
documents to be unsupported "by the language, logic, or history of the Act." Id. at 291.
Congress did not limit an agency's discretion when it enacted the FOIA; therefore, it "nec-
essarily follows that the Act does not afford Chrysler any right to enjoin agency disclosure"
in a reverse-FOIA suit against the government. Id. at 294.
27. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 147-48 (1975) (court's inquiry
into FOIA nondisclosure decision ends if document found to be exempt, because Act does
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agency has determined that a requested document need not be re-
leased under the mandatory disclosure provisions of the FOIA, no
further efforts on its part are required.2 8 In practice, federal
agencies repeatedly have invoked their nondisclosure powers in the
business records context, 29 and a court has yet to order an agency
to disgorge commercially sensitive exempt material that the agency
has chosen to withhold.
Third, although a federal agency's nondisclosure discretion is
virtually absolute, its disclosure discretion is far from uncon-
strained. According to the Supreme Court,30 before an agency can
release an exempt business record, it must find that such release
would not violate the Trade Secrets Act (TSA), a criminal statute
that imposes penalties upon any federal official who discloses a
business' "trade secrets ... [or] confidential statistical data" in the
not apply to such documents); Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195,
1202-03 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (same); Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of Justice,
410 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 n.15 (C.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 612 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1979) (FOIA
permits agency to withhold information that court might disclose were it to balance equi-
ties); J. O'REILLY, supra note 7, § 9.05, at 9-14 (court has no equitable authority to order
disclosure if exemption applies; "[aigency discretion against disclosure of legally exempt docu-
ments is not limited").
28. An agency's determination that a requested document falls within an FOIA exemp-
tion, however, must be made carefully. That determination cannot contain mere "conclu-
sory and generalized allegations" in support of an exemption's applicability; rather, a "de-
tailed analysis" as to why the automatic disclosure provisions of the FOIA do not apply is
necessary. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977
(1974). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), a court will order the disclosure of any mate-
rial which an in camera examination reveals to be nonexempt at law. See, e.g., Brockway v.
Department of Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 1975) (statements did not consti-
tute trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information, although they could
be withheld under another FOIA exemption); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW,
504 F.2d 238, 244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (noncommercial sci-
entist's research design not protected under terms of subsection (b)(4)).
29. See Federal Information Tools, Alexandria, Virginia, 3 DOE (CCH) 80,163 (Apr.
30, 1979) (Department of Energy will not determine whether disclosure of exempt business
documents might be in public interest); FDA Public Information, 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(c)
(1980) (FDA regulations bar disclosure of trade secrets or confidential commercial infor-
mation); EPA Public Information, 40 C.F.R. § 2.119(b) (1980) (EPA regulations explicitly
prohibit discretionary release of exempt (b)(4) documents); GAO FOIA REPORT, supra note
14, at 22 (exemptions applied automatically by some agencies).
In 1977, the Attorney General urged that agencies "not withhold documents unless it is
important to the public interest to do so, even if there is some arguable legal basis for the
withholding." Letter from Griffin B. Bell to Heads of all Federal Departments and
Agencies (May 5, 1977), reprinted in 2 Gov'T DxscLosuRE (P-H) 300,775. The Chairman
of the Justice Department's Freedom of Information Committee, however, subsequently as-
sured business representatives that "[tihe encouragement of discretionary releases in [the
Attorney General's] letter is not aimed at the area of business confidentiality, but is aimed
primarily at internal government deliberations under exemption 5." Saloschin & Pitt, supra
note 18, at 1061 (statement of Robert L. Saloschin).
30. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294-301 (1979).
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absence of legal authorization. 31 Further, unless an agency's disclo-
sure regulations specifically have been contemplated or approved
by Congress, they do not in themselves constitute sufficient "au-
thoriz[ation] by law" under the TSA to justify the release of confi-
dential business data.3 2
Although the precise parameters of the TSA and similar stat-
utes33 have yet to be spelled out,34 Chrysler's interpretation of the
statute poses a substantial obstacle to discretionary agency disclo-
sure efforts. If, despite the urging of some commentators, 35 the
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). For a discussion of the legislative history of the TSA, see
Clement, supra note 21, at 607-13.
At the time of Chrysler, no employee of the United States had ever been convicted of
violating section 1905 for action taken in accordance with agency guidelines or regulations.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.025 (1980). Prior to
Chrysler, courts and commentators had disagreed as to whether the TSA served as a limita-
tion on the disclosure powers of federal agencies under the FOIA. See 1978 FOIA REPORT,
supra note 1, at 57-59; Campbell, supra note 21, at 144-45; Clement, supra note 21, at
613-17; English, supra note 14, at 164.
32. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-12 (1979). According to the Court, for
an agency to satisfy section 1905's "authorized by law" standard, its disclosure decisions
must be based either upon a statute, id. at 306, or upon regulations issued in accordance
with a congressional "grant of legislative authority," id. at 308. The Court rejected a num-
ber of other possible justifications of sufficient "authorization" under section 1905: the
FOIA itself, id. at 303-04; agency "housekeeping" disclosure regulations, id. at 308-12; and
agency disclosure regulations promulgated in the absence of "a nexus between the regula-
tions and some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Congress," id. at 304.
33. See R. Ehlke, Federal Protection of Trade Secrets and Proprietary, Commercial and
Financial Information Obtained by Government Agencies in the Context of Energy-
Related Data (Oct. 13, 1977) (Congressional Research Service No. 77-226A). Ehlke enu-
merates 68 statutory provisions that in various ways limit disclosure of trade secrets and
confidential business information by agencies. Id. at 12, 54-101. Most of these provisions in
fact simply incorporate either the FOIA or the TSA by reference. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
1193(c) (1976) (Flammable Fabrics Act; incorporating TSA); 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1976) (secu-
rities information; incorporating FOIA); 15 U.S.C. § 773(b) (1976) (energy information;
incorporating both TSA and FOIA).
34. The Chrysler Court refused to determine whether exemption (b)(4) and section 1905
encompassed the same materials, 441 U.S. at 319 n.49, and also declined to decide whether
the TSA was an "exempting statute" within the terms of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (FOIA does
not apply to information "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute," with certain
conditions), 441 U.S. at 319 n.49. Instead, the case was remanded for a determination as to
"whether the contemplated disclosures would violate the prohibition of § 1905." Id. at 319.
35. Before Chrysler, a number of commentators suggested that, in light of its sketchy
legislative history, the TSA should be interpreted narrowly so as to apply only to the lim-
ited substantive areas covered by its three predecessor disclosure statutes. See 1978 FOIA
REPORT, supra note 1, at 58; Clement, supra note 21, at 613-24; English, supra note 14, at
165-67. The Department of Justice has adopted this construction for future litigation pur-
poses. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Assistant Attorney General's Memorandum, Current and Fu-
ture Litigation Under Chrysler v. Brown (June 21, 1979), reprinted in 2 Gov'T DIscLOsuRE
(P-H) 300,791, at 300,794. Compare Note, Chrysler Corporation v. Brown: Seeking a For-
mula for Responsible Disclosure Under the FOIA, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 159, 179 (1979) (broad
reading of TSA undesirable because it could "prohibit disclosure of virtually all business-
related information") and Note, Reverse FOIA Suits After Chrysler: A New Direction, 48
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TSA is read quite broadly, so as to apply to most if not all of the
business information deemed to fall within the (b)(4) exemption,
then the amount of business information that could be released by
an agency under the FOIA would be severely restricted. 36 A num-
ber of courts, relying upon the TSA, have overturned agency deci-
sions to disclose records the release of which had been sanctioned
prior to the Chrysler decision.37 Other courts, while upholding an
agency's decision to disclose, have demanded a considerable show-
ing that the disclosure regulations under review in fact received the
necessary congressional blessing. 8 In addition, a number of
agencies have attempted to reduce their own discretion to a mini-
mum by issuing advance determinations, either in the form of rul-
ings or regulations, as to the confidentiality and disclosability of
whole categories of documents within their files.39 Thus, although
the FOIA itself does not limit an agency's disclosure discretion, in
recent years courts and agencies have significantly undermined
that discretion.
Fourth and finally, if an agency exercises its discretion to disclose
FosDHA.s L. REv. 185, 199-202 (1979) (urging narrow interpretation of TSA) with Note, su-
pra note 12, at 290-91 (TSA should be construed identically in scope to exemption (b)(4) to
afford significant protection to submitters of confidential information).
36. Although the Court in Chrysler both acknowledged and sanctioned agency disclo-
sure discretion in the context of the FOIA, see 441 U.S. at 294, the Court nonetheless un-
dercut much of that discretion by resurrecting the TSA. If the TSA is read broadly, then
before a federal agency could release allegedly sensitive business documents, it would have
to demonstrate that its actions were taken in accordance with an explicit legislative man-
date designed to further certain regulatory ends-the same standard that governed agency
disclosure decisionmaking before the adoption of the FOIA.
37. Compare General Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 1 GOV'T DIscLosuRE (P-H) 4 80,019
(E.D. Va. Jan. 3, 1980) (EEO manning tables) and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marshall, 1 GoV'T
DiscLosuE (P-H) 79,163 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 1979) (same) with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 163-66 (D.D.C. 1976) (allowing access to certain EEO forms on
grounds that much of information contained therein was nonconfidential).
38. See, e.g., Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 625 F.2d 719, 724 (6th Cir. 1980) (Medi-
care Provider Cost reports can be released without violating TSA because HEW regulations
satsify Chrysler "nexus" test); St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Harris, 604 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir.
1979) (same); Cedars Nursing & Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co.,
472 F. Supp. 296, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (same).
39. See, e.g., FDA Public Information, 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.100-.119 (1980) (mandating dis-
closure or nondisclosure under FOIA of specific categories of records); EPA Public Infor-
mation, 40 C.F.R. § 2.207 (1980) (providing for class determinations for certain types of
business material). See generally 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 40-46 (discussing
agency substantive disclosure rules); 2 GoV'T DIscLosuRE (P-H) TM 303,011-402,421 (1980)
(collecting relevant federal agency regulations). At least one agency has seized upon the
TSA and Chrysler to justify its refusal even to entertain requests for the disclosure of ex-
empt business documents. See Federal Information Tools, Alexandria, Virginia, 3 DOE
(CCH) 4 80,163, at 80,809-10 (Apr. 30, 1979) (inappropriate, in light of Chrysler and TSA,
to consider factor such as "public interest" in making FOIA disclosure decisions; if docu-
ment falls within (b)(4) exemption, it should never be released).
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information that falls within an exemption but is not covered by
the TSA and similar statutes, the agency must still demonstrate to a
reviewing court that it did not abuse its discretion. 40 The courts
have not yet explained precisely what would constitute an abuse of
discretion in this context. The only standard that can be extracted
from the cases is that, in deciding whether or not to release a par-
ticular exempt business document, agencies should engage in some
sort of balancing test designed to determine whether the public
benefit to be realized from disclosure outweighs the risk of injury
to the submitter of the information. 41 This rough balancing pro-
cess will be examined in more detail below.
To date, these four emerging doctrines have failed to settle the
controversy surrounding the disclosure of business records under
the FOIA.4 2 The doctrines need both reexamination and revision.
II. Rethinking the Business Records Controversy
In essence, the business records dispute stems from the clash of
two powerful yet conflicting principles, one favoring the disclosure
and the other the nondisclosure of government-held business doc-
uments. For the most part, existing legal doctrines attempt to fore-
close examination of the conflicts underlying each particular FOIA
request. Although this approach may minimize agency effort, it re-
40. Although the Chrysler Court found no private right of action under the TSA for
submitters of business documents, 441 U.S. at 316-17, a party having reason to believe its
secrets are soon to be made public by a federal agency can seek judicial review under sec-
tion 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2) (1976), after it has
exhausted its administrative appeals. 441 U.S. at 318; see Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases
During 1979, 32 AD. L. REv. 411, 439-40 (1980) (submitter's ability to prevent disclosure
not affected despite Chrysler's elimination of reverse-FOIA action, since suits can be
brought under APA).
41. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 534 F.2d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 1976)
(balancing of public and private interests necessary to avoid abuse of agency disclosure dis-
cretion); Doctors Hosp. of Sarasota, Inc. v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 476, 480-81 (M.D. Fla.
1978) (same); 1965 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3 (philosophy of full agency disclosure
to be balanced in particular cases with important privacy rights); Note, Administrative Disclo-
sure of Private Business Records Under the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Alternative
Methods of Review, 28 SYRACUSE L. REv. 923, 966-70 (1977) (same).
42. See Lemann, Freedom of Information Act: More Helpful to Lawyers, Wash. Post, June 7,
1980, at A3, col. 1 (use of FOIA to acquire business-related material continues). The fed-
eral courts remain deeply immersed in business records litigation. Id. (more than 150
reverse-FOIA-type cases currently pending). See also S. 2397, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. REc. S2319 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1980) (proposed amendments to FOIA designed to
provide greater protection against disclosure of government-held business information);
Notice, Administrative Conference of the United States, Freedom of Information Act;
Confidential Business Information, 45 Fed. Reg. 70,033 (1980) (soliciting examples of
agency disclosure of exempt (b)(4) material); Stevenson, supra note 18, at 16, col. I (dis-
cussing recent developments in business records controversy).
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sults in disclosure and nondisclosure decisions that appear mis-
guided when viewed from a broader perspective.
A. The Disclosure and Nondisclosure Principles
There are important reasons why a great deal of privately gener-
ated material in the files of the government should be protected
from public exposure. At the very least, a comprehensive disclo-
sure policy might impair the government's access in the future to
voluntarily submitted confidential business data.43 Furthermore,
such disclosures could inflict serious competitive harm upon partic-
ular private businesses, 44 conceivably resulting in a violation of the
Constitution. 45 Moreover, the repeated release by the government
of businesses' commercial and financial secrets might discourage
private incentives to discover, collect, and use commercially valu-
able information.46
43. See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (if not assured of confidentiality, businesses may refuse to volunteer information,
thereby impairing agencies' ability to make intelligent decisions); J. O'REiLLY, supra note 7,
§ 14.08, at 14-30 (difficult for government to obtain information from businesses that fear
it will be made public). Where businesses are required to submit certain information to the
government, however, disclosure will not impair an agency's future access to information.
See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In response to what is viewed as increasing, reckless government disclosure, a number of
businesses recently have taken steps either to prevent federal agencies from receiving cer-
tain information, see, e.g., SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 404 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1975)
(corporation refused to disclose material because SEC allegedly would not keep it secret);
1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 7, 8 (testimony of Gerald P. Norton, Deputy General
Counsel, FTC) (difficult for FTC to collect information from businesses that fear it inevita-
bly will be disclosed), or to impress upon federal agencies the need for confidential treat-
ment of any documents they submit, see, e.g., Wachtell, Disclosure to Third Parties of Informa-
tion Filed With Government Agencies: Preventing Disclosure to Third Parties, 34 Bus. LAW. 1049,
1057-60 (1979); Ward, Practical Steps for Protecting Confuential Business Information Submitted
to the Government, 1 GoV'T DiscLosuRE (P-H) 7013 (1980).
44. See, e.g., National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 681-83
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (disclosure of concessioners' financial records might cause them substantial
competitive injury); Covington & Burlington [sic], Washington, D.C., 4 DOE (CCH)
80,130 (uly 25, 1979) (disclosure of crude oil importation forms likely to cause substantial
harm to competitive positions of companies involved); J. O'REILLY, supra note 7, §§
14.07-.08 (citing cases).
45. Public disclosure of a business' trade secrets or confidential information might con-
stitute a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. Wearly v. FTC, 462 F. Supp. 589, 598
(D.N.J. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 616 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1980). Most commentators
and courts, however, have rejected the taking argument. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra
note 2, at 865-67 (forced disclosure is constitutional as reasonable regulation of commerce);
Note, Protecting Confidential Business Information From Federal Agency Disclosure After Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 109, 129-32 (1980) (questioning Wearly).
46. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Association for the Advancement of Invention and
Innovation at 2-6, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (disclosure of confidential
commercial information is disincentive to future innovation); J. O'REILLY, supra note 7, §
14.14, at 14-55 (same); Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 404 (1978) (con-
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Equally important reasons, however, can be advanced for mak-
ing available to the public many business records in the possession
of federal agencies. To the greatest extent possible, official conduct
should be transparent: government decisionmaking within the fed-
eral agencies should be exposed to public scrutiny. 47 Because
government-held business documents are relied upon by the gov-
ernment in its decisionmaking, they should be disclosed.48 This
decisionmaking transparency is justified in part by a desire to pre-
vent bureaucratic waste and corruption,49 in part by a belief that an
"open" government is a more "democratic" government,5" and in
part by a recognition that an informed public is better able to assess
not only the adequacy of the government's performance, but also
the compliance of businesses with certain important public poli-
cies. 5t
Inevitably, however, given the "mixed" character of most of the
documents involved,52 these two broad objectives conflict in
trary to legislative trend, economic theory requires more protection for private business in-
formation than personal information).
47. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE ON How TO USE
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT IN REQUESTING GOVERNMENT
DOCUMENTS, H.R. REP. No. 793, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) (openness prevents govern-
ment corruption); 1966 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2429 (FOIA designed to ensure
availability of government information to interested citizens); 1965 SENATE REPORT, Supra
note 7, at 3 (policy of full agency disclosure necessary if agencies are to be responsible to
public); Kronman, The Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
727, 733-34 (1980) (FOIA used to monitor official conduct).
48. See Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Federation of America, Women's Equity Ac-
tion League, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and Women's Legal
Defense Fund at 9-12, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (public fully in-
formed only if it has access to "submitter-generated information to which agency action or
inaction relates"); 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 (information supplied by busi-
nesses reveals how well agencies are regulating industry); cf. Koch & Rubin, supra note 12,
at 54 (public should have access to underlying private documents upon which agency deci-
sions are based).
49. See Kronman, supra note 47, at 733; Montgomery, Peters, & Weinberg, supra note
14, at 10-11 (FOIA openness likely to result in more consistent and equitable agency poli-
cies).
50. See pp. 401-02 supra.
51. See, e.g., 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 (FOIA used by those concerned
about business compliance with civil rights laws); R. STEVENSON, CORPORATIONS AND IN-
FORMATION: SECRECY, ACCESS, AND DISCLOSURE 182-96 (1980) (disclosure of information
renders corporations "more accountable for the social consequences of their behavior").
52. See 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 (commercial documents submitted to
agencies both "reveal details of business operations" and reflect "functions, operations, and
activities of Government"); cf. Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Federation of America,
Women's Equity Action League, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
and Women's Legal Defense Fund at 9-11, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)
(information that businesses consider confidential, if disclosed, enables public to examine
government's efforts at preventing private sector abuse).
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deciding whether to disclose specific business records. 53 Informa-
tion that would be of assistance in evaluating government decision-
making is precisely the information that could bestow unearned
benefit upon one business to the detriment of another.54 With only
slight variations, the same basic dilemma arises in case after case: a
decision in favor of disclosure might dampen private research in-
centives and reduce the willingness of businesses to provide infor-
mation to the government; yet a decision not to disclose could in-
terfere both with the public's ability to supervise the policy-related
decisions of business and government and with society's desire to
avoid duplicative and wasteful information-gathering efforts.
Given this dilemma, unless a decision is made at the outset to sac-
rifice one principle to the other, a scheme is needed to satisfy the
two principles and to reconcile them to the greatest extent possible
in each particular case. Existing legal doctrines do not meet this
need.
B. The Failure of Existing Legal Doctrines
Existing legal doctrines have failed to arrive at a satisfactory res-
olution of the business records disclosure-nondisclosure dilemma.
The current rules are tilted heavily in favor of the nondisclosure of
business documents; agencies possess too much nondisclosure dis-
cretion and insufficient disclosure discretion. Moreover, in those
instances in which agencies do decide whether or not to disclose,
they employ a procedural framework that is at once nebulous, re-
strictive, and arbitrary.
53. See O'Reilly, supra note 4, at 1125 (public right to know versus government's need
to keep certain information confidential).
54. For example, the public is genuinely concerned with the extent of the energy crisis,
the pricing and supply policies of the major energy producers, and the regulatory policies
of the Department of Energy. Yet virtually all information collected by the Department
consists of detailed-and valuable-price and supply data submitted in confidence by
various energy companies. Were the Department to disclose these data, the competitive po-
sition of some or all of the companies might be affected. Moreover, the Department could
find itself unable to elicit such information in the future--except under subpoena. See, e.g.,
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C., 4 DOE (CCH) 80,146 (Sept. 7, 1979) (De-
partment of Energy refusal to release data supporting alleged failure of refiners to comply
with pricing rules on grounds that disclosure could harm companies competitively and
hinder future efforts to obtain such information); 1 Department of Energy Authori-
zation-Fiscal Year 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 213-16 (1978) (Department
of Energy often must promise confidentiality to obtain business information); cf. notes 2 &
19 supra (discussing disclosure of EEO manning reports); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note
2, at 839-57 (discussing confidentiality of drug, pesticide, and chemical test data).
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1. Discretionary Nondisclosure
By permitting agencies automatically to reject requests for the
release of exempt business documents, existing legal doctrines in-
vite irrationality and bias into the administration of the (b)(4) ex-
emption. If an agency automatically exercises its discretion to pre-
vent disclosure, it will deny FOIA requests for exempt documents
without even considering the merits of those requests. The possibil-
ity of disclosure thus may be rejected irrationally at the outset, even
when further inquiry would reveal that the release of the docu-
ment would either greatly benefit the public or only moderately in-
jure the submitter.5 5 In effect, because an agency need not disclose
or even consider disclosing exempt business records, existing rules
tolerate a complete sacrifice of the disclosure to the nondisclosure
principle. 56
By permitting such absolute nondisclosure discretion, moreover,
existing rules also are unable to uncover and respond to the poten-
tial problem of agency bias or "capture. ' '57 At present, an agency
can decline to consider the release of an exempt business record
for any of a number of suspect but unexpressed reasons58 without
violating existing standards or fearing public exposure. Although
an agency's nondisclosure decision presumably is motivated by a
concern about the possible effects of releasing commercial se-
crets,5 9 there is currently no way to ascertain whether a particular
55. See J. O'REILLY, supra note 7, § 9.06, at 9-16 (agencies permitted to withhold ex-
empt records "without having to rationalize why the exemption is not being waived" even
if records pertain to "innocuous matters"); Saloschin & Pitt, supra note 18, at 1067 (state-
ment of Robert L. Saloschin, Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, U.S. Dep't of
justice) (agency permitted to withhold information having "5 per cent chance of doing
$500 worth of damage to a business" even if disclosure would save "$950 million, plus
44,000 lives").
56. Agencies have made discretionary releases of (b)(4) information on only "rare" oc-
casions. See Saloschin & Pitt, supra note 18, at 1068 (statement of Robert L. Saloschin,
Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
57. An administrative agency is "captured" when it acts primarily out of regard for the
interests of those it was meant to regulate, at the expense of the public interest or of the
agency's congressional mandate. See F. RouRaE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POL-
iCY 51-56 (2d ed. 1976) (discussing "captive agency" concept); Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1684-87 (1975) (same); cf. Engel, Intro-
duction: Information Disclosure Policies and Practices of Federal Administrative Agencies, 68 Nw.
U.L. REv. 184, 212 (1973) (agencies often refuse to disclose information in order to protect
businesses they regulate from public scrutiny); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 843
(nondisclosure of health and safety testing information may foster pro-industry bias in
agency decisionmaking).
58. Such suspect reasons for nondisclosure could include outright prejudice in favor of
certain business interests, an attempt to cover up administrative favoritism, an undue def-
erence to business submitters, or a desire not to expose business impropriety.
59. See Saloschin & Pitt, supra note 18, at 1064 (statement of Robert L. Saloschin,
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FOIA request was rejected because of an unexpressed desire to
sacrifice the public good to a favored private interest.
Traditional administrative law doctrines guard against the poten-
tial for irrationality and bias by requiring that, when making deci-
sions, agencies follow written standards,6" weigh all potentially rele-
vant factors, 61 and make a record setting forth the reasons for any
conclusion. 62 Such procedural protections are absent in the busi-
ness records context, however, because the agency's discretion not
to disclose is absolute. This arrangement undoubtedly avoids
adding to the already high administrative burdens shouldered by
agencies under the FOIA,63 but such administrative efficiency is
purchased at an inordinately high cost.
2. Mandatory Nondisclosure
Before an agency can disclose an exempt business record pursu-
ant to an FOIA request, it must ensure that release of the desired
record would violate neither the Trade Secrets Act nor any other
similar statute. These restrictions often erect a virtually insur-
mountable bar to the disclosure of government-held, business-
related materials. This subversion of the disclosure principle would
not be objectionable if Congress deliberately enacted each non-
disclosure statute after a careful determination that the particular
business document ought not to be made available to the public.64
Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (agencies refuse to
disclose exempt information to avoid inflicting competitive harm upon companies); Letter
from Griffin B. Bell to Heads of all Federal Departments and Agencies, supra note 29 (list-
ing four criteria for deciding whether to release FOIA-exempt documents).
60. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (agency failed to formulate and
publish policy rules to guide its discretion); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir.
1976) (administrator failed to establish written standards and regulations; such "unfettered
discretion" clearly violated due process).
61. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
(courts must ensure that agencies take into account all relevant factors); Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, Int'l v. CAB, 475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (agency cannot refuse to consider
possibly relevant factor when balancing to determine public interest).
62. See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962)
(exercise of agency discretion invalid in absence of findings, analysis, or some indication of
basis for decision); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584,
597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (discretionary decisions should be supported with findings of fact
and reasoned opinions).
63. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 3, 4 (statement of Sherwin Gardner, Dep-
uty Commissioner, FDA) (FDA shifted resources and personnel from policy programs to
handle crush of FOIA requests); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOIA UPDATE, Spring 1980, at 2
(cost of administering FOIA at least $47.8 million in 1978); Lemann, supra note 42, at A3
(describing actions needed to answer just one FOIA request).
64. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a), (e)(1)(D) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (providing for
confidentiality of corporate tax returns with specified exceptions). A number of commenta-
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Few nondisclosure statutes, however, are the product of such a de-
tailed and specific determination; 65 most (particularly the TSA)
arose in different contexts,6 6 speak in broad, generalized terms,67
and contain no accompanying explanation of their applicability.6 8
Problems that arise in the business records context are particu-
larly ill-suited for resolution by broad, legislatively imposed man-
dates. FOIA requests for business documents involve a wide variety
of circumstances and conditions69 and are usually unique and non-
tors have suggested that Congress proceed in precisely such a manner in order to resolve
many of the existing areas of contention in the business records context. See, e.g., Role of
Giant Corporations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on
Small Business, 92 Cong., Ist Sess. 1046, 1056 (1971) (testimony of Ralph Nader) (Congress
should enumerate types of business information deserving confidential treatment) [herein-
after cited as 1971 Senate Hearings]; Koch & Rubin, supra note 12, at 54 (Congress should
narrow scope of private documents subject to disclosure under FOIA and make such dis-
closure automatic): Note, supra note 45, at 132-33 (Congress should prohibit FOIA disclo-
sure of trade secrets and consider prohibiting FOIA disclosure of other business informa-
tion).
65. See R. Ehlke, supra note 33, at 13 (cursory review of nondisclosure statutes demon-
strates "ad hoc and haphazard" development of federal confidentiality protection).
66. Some nondisclosure statutes address concerns other than that of protecting business
information. For example, Congress has required that tax returns, 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)
(1976), and census data, 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1976), remain confidential, primarily in order to
encourage voluntary compliance with tax and census laws rather than to protect business
privacy interests.
Most nondisclosure statutes do not incorporate broader objectives, however, and serve
only to bar certain business documents from being released. See note 33 supra. Because
many of these statutes were enacted before the rise of the business records controversy and
often predate the FOIA, it is unclear precisely how they interact with the FOIA. When
Congress enacted the FOIA, it included an exemption requiring nondisclosure of informa-
tion "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). The
House report, in fact, spoke of "nearly 100 statutes ... which restrict public access to spe-
cific Government records" that "would not be modified" by the FOIA. 1966 HOUSE RP-
PORT, supra note 6, at 2427. These 100 statutes were never enumerated, however, and the
evidence suggests that Congress was only vaguely aware of what information legally could
be disclosed at the time it approved the FOIA. See J. O'Rx.LY, supra note 7, § 13.03, at
13-5 to 13-6.
To date, Congress has failed to integrate these nondisclosure statutes with the FOIA.
Courts have concluded that release of business-related data was barred under subsection
(b)(3) of the FOIA in only two contexts other than the tax and census settings: patent ap-
plications, 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976); see, e.g., Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979), and Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion material, 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976); see, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 2051 (1980).
67. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 176a (1976) (Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce may
not release "statistical information" furnished to it "in confidence.., by individuals, corpo-
rations, and firms"). Many nondisclosure statutes parallel or refer to the TSA, see note 33
supra, and the language of the TSA is quite sweeping.
68. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.31 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1980)
(discussing problems of interpreting TSA and other nondisclosure statutes); Campbell, su-
pra note 21, at 143-56 (same).
69. See 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-11 (varied examples of attempts to use
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recurring.70 Evaluating such requests often requires detailed, fact-
dependent inquiries.7 1 Such characteristics suggest that FOIA busi-
ness records matters are better addressed at the more flexible
administrative level rather than by legislation.7 2
The disadvantages that accompany a legislative attempt to draw
hard and fast disclosure lines are nowhere more evident than in
the Trade Secrets Act itself. As interpreted by the Supreme Court,
in the absence of sufficient legal authorization, the TSA apparently
would bar disclosure by the government of any trade secrets or
confidential statistical data even if (1) such material already is avail-
able to the submitter's competitors; 73 (2) the material could be re-
leased only to certain parties or in a somewhat altered form with-
out harming the submitter;74 or (3) disclosure would benefit the
public or the requester much more than it would injure the submit-
ter.7 5 The statute demonstrates how difficult it is to deal with the
FOIA to obtain business records); Campbell, supra note 21, at 107 n.28 (citing cases
involving many different types of documents); Note, supra note 2, at 339 n.3 (same).
70. Some documents are requested more than once; in those cases an agency need not
redetermine its initial disclosure decision, see J. O'REILLY, supra note 7, § 9.07, at 9-19 to
9-21.
71. See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (agency must determine in each case whether disclosure would cause substantial
harm to submitter); ICF, Inc., Washington, D.C., 3 DOE (CCH) 80,147 (Mar. 14, 1979)
(quoting Policy Letter No. 78-3, Office of Federal Procurement Policy of the Office of
Management and Budget, that agencies must examine individually the facts in each case
before making disclosure decision); GAO FOIA REPORT, supra note 14, at 39 (disposition
of one FOIA request involved review of 400,000 documents).
72. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 68, § 2.12, at 112 (administrative discretion
more desirable than legislative rulemaking for problems that "cannot be governed by rules
or even by meaningful standards because no one knows how to write the rules or
standards"); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 35-36 (1965) (legisla-
tive power should be delegated to agencies "where the relations to be regulated are highly
technical or where their regulation requires a course of continuous decision"); cf. Stewart,
supra note 57, at 1695 (detailed legislative policy direction to agencies often neither feasible
nor desirable).
73. Some commercially valuable information is released freely by businesses either to
other firms within a particular industry or to the public at large. See 1971 Senate Hearings,
supra note 64, at 1046, 1072 (statement of Ralph Nader) ("confidential" energy information
circulated within oil and gas industries); Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable
Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 710 (1980) (businesses "actively disseminate" valuable
information about themselves).
74. See pp. 418-19, 429 infra (discussing selective and sanitized disclosure of FOIA-
exempt business documents).
75. In Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc. v. Califano, 1 Gov'T DISCLOSURE (P-H) 79,152
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1979), HEW disclosure regulations were found insufficient to satisfy the
TSA's "authorized by law" standard, and consequently Medicare Provider Cost reports
were not released under the FOIA. No consideration was given to factors discussed in a
similar case, Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 625 F.2d 719, 724-25 (6th Cir. 1980), which
recognized that HEW and the courts have a "heavy burden" in maintaining the integrity of
the Medicare system, that hospitals that object to disclosure of their reports need not ac-
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business records controversy through legislative prescription.
3. Exercising Disclosure Discretion
If an agency decides that release of an exempt business docu-
ment would not violate the TSA, it may then decide whether to
make a discretionary disclosure of that document under the FOIA.
No precise formulation of the factors that agencies are to take into
account in exercising their disclosure discretion has been agreed
upon. Commentators simply have suggested that an agency weigh
the "public benefit" to be derived from disclosure of a (b)(4) record
against the "risk of injury" to the submitter of the requested mate-
rial.76 The few courts that have addressed the question generally
have required the agency to show that it found disclosure of a par-
ticular document to be "in the public interest," and thus did not
"abuse its discretion. 7 7
Existing legal rules governing the discretionary disclosure pro-
cess are not only unclear but also unduly restrictive, at both the in-
put and the output stages. Existing rules introduce only a limited
number of factors into the balancing process. In making discretion-
ary disclosure decisions, agencies and courts focus exclusively on
whether the release of a particular document would result in either
great benefit to the public or great injury to the submitter. Other
potentially relevant matters, such as how the requested material is
to be used, by whom, and for what purposes, are ignored.7 8 As a
result, an agency may honor an FOIA request for exempt business
cept Medicare reimbursements in the first place, and that any hospital can offset any com-
petitive disadvantage resulting from disclosure by seeking disclosure of its competitors' re-
ports.
76. See, e.g., Clement, supra note 21, at 640; Gavin, Newkirk, & Saoschin, A Short Guide
to the Freedom of Information Act, in GOVERNMENT INFORMATION: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT, SUNSHINE ACT, PRIVACY ACT 65, 99-100 (A. Levenson & H. Pitt eds. 1978); Note, su-
pra note 41, at 966.
77. See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (inter-
est of public in accurate tax assessment balanced against submitter's confidentiality interest
to determine whether agency would abuse its discretion by disclosing requested informa-
tion); note 41 supra (citing cases describing balancing).
78. Most courts and commentators have concluded that it would be inconsistent with
the language and the spirit of the FOIA for agencies to consider factors other than the
public interest and the submitter's interests when making disclosure decisions. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975) (requester's rights under
FOIA neither increased nor decreased by requester's interest in disclosure); Soucie v. Da-
vid, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (FOIA precludes consideration of interests of re-
quester); City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (requester's
contentions that it had "need to know" and that its interests were identical to those of
agency irrelevant in FOIA context); 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 23 (inquiries con-
cerning purpose of requester are "costly, time-consuming, subjective, and irrelevant"); 1 K.
DAVIS, supra note 68, § 5.6, at 320 (same).
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records even though a closer examination might expose the re-
quester's motivation to be frivolous or suspect; similarly, it may
deny an FOIA request even though a closer examination might re-
veal that significant costs would be suffered by the requester as the
result of a nondisclosure decision.79
At the output level, existing legal rules unduly limit an agency's
discretion with respect to the form an attempted disclosure could
take. Under current legal interpretations, once an agency has re-
leased a particular record pursuant to an FOIA request, that re-
cord is available to all the world for all time: the agency can neither
prevent the requester from disseminating the document to others"0
nor deny a later request for the same document by a different
party.8' The agency must assume that any document disclosed un-
der the FOIA will eventually and inevitably find its way into the
possession of the submitter's competitors .8 - This discourages the
discretionary release of exempt documents. Further, agencies have
been reluctant to experiment with various sanitized disclosure
schemes, under which exempt records might be released in a form
that makes it impossible to discover either the identity of the sub-
mitter or any of its commercially valuable secrets.8 3 Similarly, in the
79. See Koch & Rubin, supra note 12, at 25 (weakness of FOIA is that "it focuses on
types of documents rather than on specific needs of participants .... [A] person may have
access to masses of government documents regardless of the damage it may do to the
decisionmaking process, but may not have access to exempt documents even if great need
or substantial impact can be shown.")
80. See Null & Null, Garden City, New York, 3 DOE (CCH) 80,154 (Apr. 4, 1979)
(agencies, unlike courts, cannot issue protective orders to prevent dissemination of confi-
dential information); 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 23 n.62 (agencies have no au-
thority to restrict requester's use of FOIA information); cf. Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166,
171 & n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (criticizing "use-specified release" of FOIA documents); Dis-
abled Officer's Ass'n v. Rumsfeld, 428 F. Supp. 454, 456 n.3 (D.D.C. 1977) (same); Clem-
ent, supra note 21, at 643 (same).
81. See City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1971); J.
O'REILLY, supra note 7, § 9.07, at 9-18 (would constitute abuse of discretion for agency to
favor one requester over another). But see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOIA UPDATE, Summer
1980, at 4-5 (advising agencies that "discretionary access to a particular person" does not
necessarily mean "that access must be granted to all persons").
82. See Clement, supra note 21, at 643 (agencies should assess competitive harm to sub-
mitters in light of assumption that "competitors will gain access" to disclosed information).
83. See Weinberg, Protecting Conjidential Business Information: The Paper Industry's "Third
Party Arrangement" With EPA, in 1 Gov'T DISCLOSURE (P-H) t 7011, at 7012 (1979)
(describing scheme whereby certain businesses submit financial information to an inde-
pendent accounting firm, which forwards data to EPA in tabular form; the agreement
keeps " 'raw' confidential business information out of the possession of EPA ... and thus
out of the possession of competitors and the public," yet allows EPA (and the public) "rea-
sonable access to information"). The FOIA mandates that "[a]ny reasonably segregable
portion of a record" be released after "deletion" of exempt portions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(1976). This provision has been used merely as authority to separate exempt from
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absence of clear statutory or precedential authority, agencies have
made no effort to determine whether additional disclosure of ex-
empt documents might be permissible if the requester agreed to
compensate the submitter for any competitive advantage gained at
the latter's expense . 4
In sum, a more coherent approach to the disclosure process
would attempt to evaluate, for each particular FOIA request for an
exempt business document, all of the relevant public and private
costs and benefits that would accompany disclosure. A more coher-
ent approach also would authorize agencies to release business doc-
uments to one party but not to another, to one party in exchange
for a promise of confidentiality, or to any party in a form that
makes it impossible for that party to profit at the competitive ex-
pense of the submitter.
III. Addressing the Business Records Controversy
Existing legal doctrines have been unable satisfactorily to apply
the conflicting principles of disclosure and nondisclosure to partic-
ular cases. The statutes, regulations, and procedures that govern
FOIA disclosure decisions with respect to business records should
be revised to provide a more rational approach to the discretion-
ary disclosure process, with greater disclosure discretion and less
nondisclosure discretion.
A. Two Procedural Models
The discovery of business documents in civil litigation and the
disclosure of personnel and medical files under the FOIA offer
guidance for application of the principles of disclosure and
nondisclosure in the business records setting. A framework for
nonexempt portions of a document, however, and not as authority to release exempt
portions in a sanitized form.
84. See Note, supra note 2, at 356-67 (outlining proposal whereby successful FOIA re-
questers of confidential business information would compensate submitters for loss suf-
fered as result of disclosure). A compensated disclosure scheme has been adopted by Con-
gress for use under both the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (Supp. III 1979), and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The TSCA requires manufacturers of
toxic substances to make health and safety test data public, 15 U.S.C. § 2613(b) (1976), but
provides that if one manufacturer, in order to obtain an exemption from the Act's testing
requirements, relies upon data previously made public by another manufacturer, then un-
less the two manufacturers "agree on the amount and method of reimbursement," the EPA
"shall order the person granted the exemption to provide fair and equitable reimburse-
ment... to the person who previously submitted such test data," 15 U.S.C. § 2603(c)(3)(A)
(1976). See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 874-82 (discussing compensated disclosure
provisions of FIFRA and TSCA).
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dealing with requests for confidential business information under
the FOIA can be developed by examining the procedures em-
ployed in these two contexts.
1. The Civil Discovery Model
Requests for discovery of trade secrets and confidential business
information arise frequently under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 5 In ruling upon such discovery requests, the
courts face the same two principles that conflict in the business re-
cords context. On the one hand, there are compelling reasons why
commercial documents should be discoverable in a civil proceed-
ing, even in a case involving two competitors. Often, the desired
confidential business records constitute the evidentiary heart of a
lawsuit, 86 so that many important civil actions could not be main-
tained if a special privilege existed for commercially sensitive mate-
rial. Moreover, such a privilege would violate traditional notions
that discovery should be liberal and wide ranging.87 On the other
hand, courts are loath to allow one party to obtain a competitive
advantage at the expense of another as a collateral consequence of
the discovery process. 88
Rule 26 vests the decision as to whether or not a particular trade
secret or confidential record is discoverable in the discretion of the
trial judge.89 In exercising that discretion, a judge generally exam-
85. "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See
generally R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 7.06 (1980); 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE i
26.60[4], 26.75 (2d ed. 1979); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 2020, 2035-44 (1970 & Supp. 1979).
86. See, e.g., Service Liquor Distrib. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 16 F.R.D. 507, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (competitor's business records "precisely the source of the most relevant
evidence").
87. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (discovery rules to be accorded
"broad and liberal treatment"): Advisory Comm. Note, 5 F.R.D. 433, 454 (1946) (discovery
to involve "broad search for facts" and inquiry into "matters in themselves inadmissible as
evidence").
88. See Dore, Confidentiality Orders-The Proper Role of the Courts in Providing Confidential
Treatment for Information Disclosed Through the Pre-Trial Discovery Process, 14 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 1, 8 n.45 (1978); Senio, Protection of Trade Secrets in Litigation: Guarding Against the "In-
finite Mischief' of Unrestricted Disclosure, in R. MILGIM, supra note 85, at Il-1.
89. See A.H. Robins Co. v. Fadely, 299 F.2d 557, 562 (5th Cir. 1962); 8 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 85, § 2043, at 305 (citing cases). Appellate courts, however, occasion-
ally will correct a trial judge's abuse of discretion in the business documents discovery con-
text. See, e.g., Natta v. Zletz, 405 F.2d 99, 100 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 909
(1969) (overturning "unduly restrictive" discovery order); Hartley Pen Co. v. United States
Dist. Court, 287 F.2d 324, 331 (9th Cir. 1961) (mandamus issued to overturn sweeping dis-
covery order).
The assertion in Rule 26 that parties may obtain discovery of relevant matters "not privi-
leged" has never been construed so as automatically to exclude confidential business infor-
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ines a number of factors, including the contents of the requested
document, 90 the status of the party seeking discovery, 9' the party's
need for the document in order to make its case, 92 and the harm
that would result to the party against whom discovery is being
sought if the document were released. 93 As a general rule, business
records are held discoverable upon a party's showing that the de-
sired records are "relevant or may lead to relevant matters" in a
particular civil case. 94
Despite this liberal approach to disclosure, however, courts have
not neglected nondisclosure. A court will not hesitate to deny a
trade secret discovery request if no legitimate purpose for the re-
quest has been advanced. 95 Further, if convinced that disclosure
would result in a "clearly defined, serious injury" to the person or
business whose records are involved, 96 a court will issue a protec-
mation. See Federal Open Market Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 (1979) (no absolute
privilege for confidential business information); Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340
F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965) (same); Advisory Comm. Note,
48 F.R.D. 487, 505 (1970) (courts have afforded business secrets "limited protection,"
weighing in each case "claim to privacy" against "need for disclosure").
90. See, e.g., Monaco v. Miracle Adhesives Corp., 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1401, 1402 (E.D.
Pa. 1979) (court inquires into whether information sought to be protected is confidential or
trade secret); United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same).
91. See, e.g., Everco Indus., Inc. v. O.E.M. Prods. Co., 362 F. Supp. 204, 206 (N.D. Ill.
1973) (competitor may not discover confidential documents without sufficient cause); Tri-
angle Mfg. Co. v. Paramount Bag Mfg. Co., 35 F.R.D. 540, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (court re-
luctant to make party's commercial secrets available to competitor); 4 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 85, 26.60[4], at 26-243 n.2 (some cases have emphasized "absence of
business competition" between litigants as basis for rejecting confidentiality claim).
92. See, e.g., Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 287 F.2d 324, 331 (9th Cir.
1961) (documents not "relevant and necessary" to matter at issue cannot be discovered);
Stanley Works v. Haeger Potteries, Inc., 35 F.R.D. 551, 555 (N.D. Il. 1964) (same); Service
Liquor Distrib. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 16 F.R.D. 507, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (discovery
permitted because competitor's records constituted "most relevant evidence").
93. See, e.g., United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553, 556-57 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 820 (1969) (discovery denied upon showing by party that it would be
harmed were information disclosed); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48
F.R.D. 308, 311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (party opposing discovery failed to demonstrate it
would be harmed by disclosure).
94. Natta v. Zletz, 405 F.2d 99, 101 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 909 (1969) (al-
lowing discovery of "valuable trade secrets" which lower court labeled irrelevant and
undiscoverable). See generally R. MILGRIM, supra note 85, § 7.06[1][b] (citing cases discussing
"relevancy"). Because courts have declined to recognize an absolute privilege for confiden-
tial business information, discovery routinely has been allowed with respect to a multitude
of sensitive commercial documents, including secret sales information, product ingredient
summaries, manufacturing process descriptions, customer lists, research data, and produc-
tion cost information. See 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, SUpra note 85, 26.60[4] (citing
cases).
95. See, e.g., Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 287 F.2d 324, 331 (9th Cir.
1961) (defendant failed to demonstrate that documents sought were "relevant and neces-
sary to its proper defense of the main action"); Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. General
Foods Corp., 50 F.R.D. 184, 186 (D. Del. 1970) (same).
96. Monaco v. Miracle Adhesives Corp., 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1401, 1402 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
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tive order under Rule 26(c).97 Protective orders, though varying in
form, generally restrict either a party's access to98 or its collateral
use of 99 commercially valuable information made available during
civil discovery. Through the creative employment of protective or-
ders, courts attempt to reconcile demands for wide-ranging discov-
ery with claims for business confidentiality.' 00
The procedural techniques that courts have used to address the
competing arguments surrounding the discovery of confidential
commercial information can be applied to the rules governing the
disclosure of business records under the FOIA.10' Agencies, like
(following United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). No protective
order was issued in Monaco because the party resisting discovery could not make such a
showing.
97. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and
for good cause shown, the court . . . may make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue bur-
den or expense, including ... (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, de-
velopment, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a desig-
nated way ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
98. See, e.g., Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965) (documents made available only to counsel and independent
accountants); Gentron Corp. v. H.C. Johnson Agencies, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 415, 419 (E.D. Wis.
1978) (disclosure only to party's attorneys, employees, and experts); Tosa Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 55 F.R.D. 41, 43 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (disclosure
only to "those persons, not competitors of the defendant, whose aid is necessary in the
preparation of the plaintiff's case").
99. See, e.g., Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965) (documents made available only for "purposes of the case"
and not competitive purposes); Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431,
434 (N.D. Il1. 1976) (public disclosure prohibited); Maritime Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Movies
en Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (documents to be returned to court
when no longer needed for trial preparation); Hunter v. International Sys. & Controls
Corp., 51 F.R.D. 251, 262 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (documents made available pursuant to already
existing contract that they not be disclosed to anyone else).
100. Other variations on the protective order theme are possible. See Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F. Supp. 280, 284-85 (E.D.N.C. 1973) (discovery
permitted after deletion of "names, addresses, and income data of the persons providing
the information"); Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 11 F.R.D. 562, 566 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) (party ordered to disclose names of only fifty customers).
101. The business records situation differs in two respects from the civil discovery
process. First, unlike the FOIA context where information can be requested without a
showing of need, before a party can employ civil discovery tools it must present a claim
upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). That required showing, however,
has not proved very burdensome under modern rules of pleading, see 2A MooRE's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 8.13 (2d ed. 1980), and courts are reluctant to dismiss an action for fail-
ure to state a claim before the complaining party has had an opportunity to use "the ma-
chinery of discovery ... to ferret out facts and delineate issues," Mitchell v. E-Z Way Tow-
ers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 130-31 (5th Cir. 1959). Some frivolous suits undoubtedly are
dismissed at the complaint stage before discovery can be obtained, and no such procedure
is possible under the FOIA. Nevertheless, even though frivolous FOIA requests for busi-
ness documents cannot be rejected at the outset, they can be entertained, balanced, and
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courts operating under Rule 26, should take all potentially relevant
factors into account, including the interests and the needs of the
requester, in making FOIA disclosure decisions regarding business
records. In addition, agencies should experiment with protective
orders,10 2 so that a deserving FOIA request need not be denied
simply because of fear that commercially valuable information
might become available to a submitter's competitors.
2. The FOJA Personal Privacy Model
An intricate balancing scheme has been developed to reconcile
the competing claims of disclosure and nondisclosure in a second
denied with little effort and with the same result as under civil discovery-the document is
not made available to an undeserving requester. Moreover, any presumption in favor of
disclosure that might exist in the civil discovery setting as a result of the necessity for an in-
itial showing of a valid claim need not be applied in the FOIA context, where such a show-
ing is not required.
Second, it might be argued that the civil discovery model and the FOIA context differ
because federal agencies, unlike judges, will not always be able to act impartially and with-
out self-interest in making disclosure decisions. The potential for agency bias, however, ex-
ists to an even greater extent under current legal arrangements, because agencies possess
absolute nondisclosure discretion. This Note seeks to improve upon existing arrangements
by requiring agencies to evaluate rationally in each case all relevant facts and interests. Al-
though the potential for agency bias will not disappear with the adoption of a more open
and rational procedural system, agencies are expected in other contexts to act impartially
in accordance with prescribed procedural rules, even in situations in which it might seem
inherently difficult for them to do so. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 55-59 (1941) (agencies vested with both policymaking and adjudicatory re-
sponsibilities, despite resulting potential for intra-agency conflict). Finally, judicial review is
available to challenge an agency's abuse of its disclosure discretion. Cf. L. JAFFE, supra note
72, at 325 (even though agency is primarily responsible for objectives of good administra-
tion, judicial review needed to check administrative activity).
102. In Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the
court suggested that exempt documents could be released "on the condition that [the re-
quester] keep them confidential." The court did not address the enforcement question,
however, and some commentators have suggested that agencies lack authority to punish
for violation of the terms of any restricted-use agreement. See Clement, supra note 21, at
643; Note, Would Macy's Tell Gimbel's: Government-Controlled Business Information and the Free-
dom of Information Act, Forwards & Backwards, 6 Loy. CHI. L.J. 594, 606 n.83 (1975).
Without additional statutory authority, agencies may be able to enforce protective-order-
type agreements simply by stressing to the requester that the information released to it is
not to be disclosed to another party. See Murphy v. Department of Army, 613 F.2d 1151,
1158 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Agencies may be able to exert a number of extralegal pressures to enforce such restrictions
(for example, an agency might announce that violators of confidentiality agreements will
receive adverse publicity and will be denied access to exempt documents in the future).
Moreover, in making its disclosure decision in the first place, an agency could take into ac-
count the probability that a particular requester would abide by a confidentiality promise.
Agencies also may choose to reject a request for exempt business records, encourage the
requester to bring an FOIA suit in district court, and then enter into a stipulated, court-
enforceable protective order restricting the requester's ability to disseminate any docu-
ments that the requester receives.
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context. Subsection 552(b)(6) of the FOIA exempts from the Act's
mandatory disclosure requirements "personnel and medical files
: * the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy." 10 3 The interests at stake in the (b)(6)
personal privacy setting are quite similar to those implicated by the
(b)(4) business records exemption. On the one hand, a policy of
unlimited disclosure might severely invade the privacy of individu-
als named in government-held personnel and medical files10 4 and
might reduce the incentives of private parties to collect and pro-
duce such information in the future.105 On the other hand, a com-
prehensive nondisclosure approach might conceal government
wrongdoing' 0 6 and might encourage the wasteful duplication of
information-gathering efforts.' 0 7
In deciding cases under the FOIA (b)(6) exemption, agencies
and courts have engaged in a balancing process 108 instead of
endorsing either a disclosure or nondisclosure outcome.10 9 Even
103. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
104. See Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (exemption protects individuals from "public disclosure of intimate details
of their lives"); J. O'REIIUY, supra note 7, § 16.01, at 16-2 (exemption prevents government
from acting as clearinghouse for detailed private information); Comment, The Freedom of
Information Act's Privacy Exemption and the Privacy Act of 1974, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
596, 600-05 (1976) (distussing privacy interest). But see Kronman, supra note 47, at 738-41
(criticizing overconcern of courts with desire of individuals to prevent "revelation of em-
barrassing facts" and to avoid "unrequested solicitations").
105. See Kronman, supra note 47, at 736-37 (FOIA exemptions protect private
information-production incentives); Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFFALO L.
REv. 1, 10 (1979) (secrecy is "important social instrument" for encouraging production of
information).
106. See Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (disclosure of material
containing personal information would allow public to assess performance of agency); 1965
SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9 (highly personal information should be public knowl-
edge in some cases); J. O'REI..Y, supra note 7, § 16.07, at 16-17 (exemption ensures that
agency files remain open to public scrutiny).
107. See Kronman, supra note 47, at 737-38 (disclosure of data can facilitate more effi-
cient use of resources by making it unnecessary to collect data twice).
108. See, e.g., Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976) (individual's
"right of privacy" balanced against need to expose agency action to "light of public scru-
tiny").
109. After a detailed investigation of the private and public interests involved in a par-
ticular case, a court will order disclosure (in spite of an individual's privacy claim) unless
the benefits to be realized by either the requester or the public or both are clearly out-
weighed by the costs to be borne by either the affected individual or the public or both.
Compare Columbia Packing Co., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 563 F.2d 495,
498-500 (1st Cir. 1977) (public interest in ensuring that agency officials acted properly be-
fore their discharge for bribery outweighs privacy interests of those officials in not having
information about their careers, families, finances, and health disclosed) with Committee on
Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 220-21 (3d Cir. 1977) (disclosure of union author-
ization cards of no public interest and serious invasion of employee privacy rights).
424
Business Records
without express statutory authority to do so,"10 courts on occasion
have looked to the identity of the requesting party and the motiva-
tion behind its request."' Courts have recognized that information
made available to one party for a particular purpose under the
(b)(6) exemption need not necessarily be made available to another
party for a different purpose."12 Although there are differences
between the (b)(4) and (b)(6) FOIA exemption contexts," t3 the in-
terpretation of the personal privacy exemption nevertheless dem-
onstrates both that civil-discovery-type procedures are not wholly
foreign to the FOIA context, and that agencies are quite capable of
making rational and impartial disclosure decisions in the absence
of legislatively imposed categorical constraints.
There is, moreover, a strong structural similarity between the
110. See 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 23 n.62 (criticizing consideration of na-
ture of requester's interest in disclosure in addition to public interest when balancing un-
der (b)(6)).
111. See, e.g., Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1974) (re-
quester cannot seek (b)(6) material solely for "private commercial exploitation"); Rose v.
Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 270 (2d Cir. 1974) (Moore, J., dissenting), affd,
425 U.S. 352 (1976) (criticizing "curiosity satisfying efforts of three law school students
who [seek] merely to write a Law Review note"); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (two professors---" 'among the ablest young labor law professors'-
engaged in research of "unusual promise" permitted to receive personal material otherwise
private); Rabbitt v. Department of Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(threat to privacy balanced against requester's need for documents). But see Committee on
Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1977) (requester's private benefit
from disclosure of (b)(6) document not relevant).
112. See, e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (information
released under exemption (b)(6) may be used "only by the requesting party and for the
public interest purpose upon which the balancing was based"; future request for the same
information by "less well qualified applicants" would require "new balancing" with poten-
tially different outcome). But see Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 171 & n.21 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (criticizing Getman selective disclosure rationale); Comment, supra note 104, at 616-17
(same).
113. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Brown, 443 F. Supp. 1225, 1233 (E.D. Va.
1977) (provisions on their face set forth "substantially different" tests); 1965 SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 7, at 9 (balancing of interests explicitly authorized in (b)(6) context). Dif-
ferences in the language and the legislative history of the two exemptions do not diminish
the value of the (b)(6) procedure as a model. It may be argued, however, that there are
fundamental differences having to do with the nature of the documents involved in the
(b)(4) and (b)(6) settings. Compare R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION 138 (1976) ("privacy" is individual right and cannot be invoked to prevent
disclosure of business information) with Posner, supra note 46, at 404 (commercial secrets
more deserving of confidential treatment than personal secrets). The fact that personal in-
formation may be more deserving of protection than commercial information (or vice
versa) suggests not that a balancing approach is inappropriate in the (b)(4) area, but only
that after the balances are struck, more commercial records will be released than business
records (or vice versa). Cf. Koch & Rubin, supra note 12, at 50 (both (b)(4) and (b)(6) ex-
emptions attempt to protect rights of those who submit private information to govern-
ment).
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(b)(4) and the (b)(6) situations. The typical FOIA request 114 in-
volves only two parties: an individual or organization seeks infor-
mation compiled by and in the possession of a federal agency. 1 5 In
this context, because the desired document reflects directly on the
performance of the agency charged with making the disclosure de-
cision, 116 it is difficult for the agency to remain neutral, and legisla-
tively imposed constraints may be necessary in order to compensate
for the agency's inevitable self-bias.1 1 7 In both the standard busi-
ness records and personal privacy contexts, however, three parties
are involved: one individual, organization, or business has re-
quested information compiled and submitted to a government
agency in confidence by another individual, organization, or busi-
ness.1 18 In many cases, the agency involved has no particular stake
in the disclosure outcome. 19 With personal privacy matters, there-
fore, agencies explicitly are called upon to resolve the two parties'
conflicting claims, in much the same manner as a court might bal-
ance the competing interests of litigants in civil discovery. In the
business records context, however, despite this structural similarity
to personal privacy requests, existing legal doctrines provide for lit-
tle agency disclosure discretion.
114. Typical FOIA requests for government-held documents are those considered un-
der exemptions (b)(1) (national security information), (b)(2) (internal agency regulations),
(b)(3) (information exempt by statute), (b)(5) (agency memoranda), or (b)(7) (law enforce-
ment records).
115. 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
116. See 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 24-25 (when disputes arise under most ex-
emptions, requester and agency generally represent different sides of disclosure question);
S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1974) (agencies withhold certain information
from requesters in order to prevent political embarrassment or exposure of error and
waste); Patten & Weinstein, supra note 4, at 202 (in typical FOIA case, agency and re-
quester are adverse parties).
117. See 1965 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3 ("essential" that agencies be given "de-
finitive guidelines" in order to prevent overwithholding).
118. 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 24. Arguably, this three-party situation also
exists with two other FOIA exemptions: (b)(8) (reports about financial institutions) and
(b)(9) (geological information). Very few cases have arisen under the latter two subsections,
and therefore they have been ignored throughout this Note. It has been argued, however,
that any guidelines established with respect to the (b)(4) exemption could profitably be ex-
tended to govern matters arising under subsections (b)(8) and (b)(9). See 1978 FOIA RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 24.
119. See 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 25 (agency has no real interest in disclo-
sure decision when its operations are unaffected by result); 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note
1, at 7, 14 (statement of Gerald P. Norton, Deputy General Counsel, FTC) (agency usually
only stakeholder, with actual contest taking place between requester and submitter); Eng-
lish, supra note 14, at 151-52 (agency, as "stakeholder," "occupies a delicate position in the
midst of the submitter's and requester's competing interests, requiring Odyssean skills to
safely navigate the narrow strait between Scylla and Charybdis").
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B. Toward Resolution of the Business Records Controversy
An alternative and more coherent approach to the reconciliation
of the competing claims of disclosure and nondisclosure in the
business records controversy is preferable to existing practices.
This alternative approach, based in part on the civil discovery and
FOIA personal privacy models, is designed to ensure that neither
public nor private interests in disclosure are sacrificed unnecessar-
ily.
Upon receipt of an FOIA request for a business document, an
agency first should determine whether or not the information is
exempt under subsection (b)(4)."' ° If nonexempt, of course, the in-
formation will be released under the FOIA's mandatory disclosure
provisions. If, however, the requested document falls within the
(b)(4) exemption, the agency should decide whether or not to re-
lease the material under the following procedural framework.
First, the doctrine of uncontrolled agency nondisclosure discre-
tion should be rejected. No absolute protection should be afforded
to any government-held business document requested under the
FOIA.' 2 1 Rather, with respect to every such request, an agency
should inquire whether or not disclosure of the document involved
would be wise in light of all the available and relevant evidence. 2
This inquiry should be made "on the record"123 in order to give
the requester some basis for challenging a nondisclosure deci-
sion.12 4
120. This determination should be made in the same manner as under existing law,
that is, in accordance with the standard set forth in National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See note 12 supra.
121. The rejection of an absolute privilege for business documents is implicit in and
consistent with the Attorney General's urging (largely ignored in the (b)(4) context) that
agencies invoke FOIA exemptions only when in "the public interest." See note 29 supra.
122. It might be argued that agencies lack the resources to make the detailed, fact-
dependent determinations called for by this Note. It should be recognized, however, that
most of the additional procedures imposed upon agencies will require only a more careful
examination and balancing of evidence already largely in their possession. Agencies already
may have to conduct an extensive factual investigation to determine whether a document is
exempt or nonexempt in the first place. See note 28 supra. Moreover, agencies can expect
both the requester and the submitter to provide, upon request, information and arguments
relating to a pending disclosure determination. See 1978 FOIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
Finally, agencies follow procedures similar to those recommended in this Note when mak-
ing disclosure decisions under the (b)(6) exemption, and there is no evidence of resulting
administrative overload.
123. Any lesser requirement would enable agencies to continue their current practice
of rejecting FOIA requests without considering the merits of the requests and without ex-
plaining the rejection. Others have recognized the need for comprehensive administrative
recordmaking in the FOIA business documents context. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Assistant
Attorney General's Memorandum, supra note 35, at 300,793; English, supra note 14, at 172.
124. A requester should be able to challenge an agency's nondisclosure decision under
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Second, Congress should eliminate those statutory provisions
that unduly constrain an agency's discretion to disclose exempt
business documents pursuant to an FOIA request. In particular,
Congress should amend the Trade Secrets Act to make it inapplica-
ble to FOIA business records requests. 125 Disclosure decisions
should be based upon an agency's case-by-case assessment of the
relevant equities, and not upon an overly broad congressional man-
date that, in practice, presents a virtually insurmountable obstacle
to the disclosure of commercially valuable documents.
Finally, agencies should follow the balancing procedures em-
ployed successfully in the civil discovery and FOIA personal pri-
vacy settings instead of relying on categorical rules that focus only
on the nature of the requested material. When considering a re-
quest for an exempt business document, an agency should assess all
relevant public and private factors, including the nature of the par-
ticular document requested, the identity and purpose of the indi-
vidual or organization seeking the document,1 26 the extent of the
requester's need for the document, 12 7 the public interest in disclo-
sure, 128 and any harm that might result to the submitter, 129 the
the Administrative Procedure Act's "abuse of discretion" standard, relied upon currently
by submitters who object to an agency's disclosure determination. See note 40 supra.
125. Congress should retain some provision akin to the TSA in order to punish indi-
vidual federal employees who use or disclose confidential commercial information while
acting outside the scope of their employment. Congress should specify, however, that the
TSA and those statutes that mirror its provisions, see note 33 supra, are not to be used to
bar administrative agencies from releasing business information on a discretionary basis
under the FOIA. In addition, Congress should reconsider the wisdom of retaining those
few nondisclosure statutes that are in fact more specific in orientation than the TSA. See
note 66 supra.
126. For example, an agency should determine if the requester is a public interest or-
ganization attempting to discover whether a particular company has complied with equal
employment opportunity laws, see note 2 supra, a private association seeking to determine
whether an agency has unfairly awarded government franchises, see, e.g., National Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974), or a competitor hoping to
learn secrets about the submitter's enterprise, see note 14 supra. It may be necessary for
agencies to institute an affidavit-type system (for example, a requester would be required
to swear to his or her identity and to whether the request is being filed on behalf of some
other individual or organization) in order to guard against the possibility that middlemen
might be employed to obtain documents that ordinarily would not be made available to the
party actually seeking disclosure.
127. An agency should determine whether the requested information can be obtained
without undue effort or expense from an alternative source.
128. See Clement, supra note 21, at 640 (agency should determine "beneficial functions
that exempt agency information might serve in the hands of private citizens").
129. This determination will already have been made in most cases because competitive
harm must be identified before a document can be declared confidential in the first place.
An agency should take into account a submitter's competitive harm only; to consider other
factors (such as the embarrassment or the litigation that might be visited upon a submitter
as the result of disclosure) would be inconsistent with the disclosure principle.
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agency,130 or the public 31 if the document were released. All of
these factors must be assessed in light of the conflicting general
principles of disclosure and nondisclosure. An agency must be con-
cerned not only with the costs and benefits to the submitter of a
document and its requester, but also with the broader public inter-
est in uncovering government corruption and business impropriety
without discouraging private research and development.
If, after conducting such a balancing process, the agency decides
that full disclosure is warranted, the requested document should be
released. If, however, full disclosure is not warranted, the agency
should undertake three additional inquiries before it ultimately de-
cides not to disclose. First, the agency should determine whether
the previously identified costs of disclosure might be eliminated or
lessened by releasing the requested material in an edited form, that
is, a form that does not reveal either the identity of the submitter
or its more closely guarded commercial secrets.1 3  Second, the
agency should determine whether the document could be released
on the condition that the requester compensate the submitter for
any commercially valuable information received, 133 or released un-
der a similar controlled scheme.' 34 Third, the agency could release
130. In most cases, an agency will have determined previously whether release of the
requested material would impair the agency's ability to collect similar information in the
future. An agency should also determine whether disclosure would assist in or detract
from the attainment of its overall policy objectives. It would be inconsistent with the disclo-
sure principle, however, for an agency to take into consideration the fact that disclosure
might expose it to charges of corruption or malfeasance.
131. Under some circumstances disclosure conceivably could harm neither the submit-
ter nor the agency, but rather a more general public interest in favor of nondisclosure,
such as, for example, the need to provide incentives to produce commercially valuable in-
formation. Cf. Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 390
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (civil discovery denied not because it would injure party opposing discov-
ery, but because it would undermine society's "profound interest" in allowing research
scholars to keep confidentiality promises).
132. For example, in National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673
(D.C. Cir. 1976), the court upheld an Interior Department nondisclosure decision with re-
spect to the financial records of park concessioners on the grounds that disclosure could
cause them substantial competitive injury from surrounding businesses. The agency and
the court apparently failed to consider whether any of the information could have been
disclosed without injury to the concessioners simply by deleting from the requested docu-
ments certain identifying material (for example, the names and locations of the concession-
ers). See Weinberg, supra note 83 (providing example of sanitized government-held infor-
mation); cf. IUE v. NLRB, No. 78-2067, slip op. at 17 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 28, 1980) (in
non-FOIA case, employee discrimination complaints disclosed to union in compiled form,
thereby preventing identification of complaining employees).
133. See note 84 supra (discussing compensated disclosure schemes).
134. For example, McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 883-86, propose that drug
health and safety test data submitted by manufacturers to the FDA be disclosed under an
"exclusive use period" arrangement. The data would be made available immediately to the
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otherwise nondisclosable material pursuant to a protective-order-
type agreement, 135 with the express condition that the recipient not
disseminate the material to others.136 In short, agencies should use
a balancing process, selective disclosure techniques, and protective
order arrangements in order to increase the amount of commercial
information made available to the public under the FOIA without
damaging the interests of those who submit such information to
the government.
public, but competitors would not be able to use it to register competing products for a
fixed period of time. Id. at 884. Such an arrangement presently exists under the FIFRA.
See note 84supra.
135. See note 102 supra (discussing ability to enforce administrative protective orders
under existing authority). If Congress provided by statute for the use of agency-issued pro-
tective order agreements under the FOIA, an agency's power to enforce restricted-use
arrangements would not be doubted. Cf. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977) (Congress can empower agencies with
factfinding and adjudicatory functions in order to enforce statutorily created public rights).
136. For example, EEO information, see note 2 supra, might be made available to a
union, an employee, or a public interest organization that wished to challenge (either infor-
mally, during collective bargaining, or in a lawsuit) a business' affirmative action efforts, so
long as the recipient agreed not to make the information public. Similarly, the documents
at issue in National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
see note 132 supra (discussing case), could have been released to the requester upon a
promise not to disclose them to any competitors of the concessioners.
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